sigstore-go has a multi-log threshold bypass via single compromised log
Moderate severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
Jun 4, 2026
in
sigstore/sigstore-go
•
Updated Jul 31, 2026
Description
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Jul 9, 2026
Reviewed
Jul 9, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Jul 17, 2026
Last updated
Jul 31, 2026
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
A verifier configured with WithTransparencyLog(N>1) or WithSignedCertificateTimestamps(N>1) expected defense-in-depth against the compromise of a single log instance. However, threshold counting counted verified witnesses per-entry or per-validation-path rather than per-log-authority.
As a result, a single compromised transparency log could forge multiple entries with different indices, and a single compromised CT log could verify multiple times (either across multiple certificate chains or via multiple embedded SCTs), fully satisfying the multi-log threshold requirements and defeating the multi-log policy.
Note that this does not affect Cosign, as Cosign sets a threshold of 1.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Upgrade to v1.1.5.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
There is no workaround, beyond relying on trusted logs.
References