Summary
Missing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path.
Impact
The tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject.
Impacted Versions:
tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x
Patches
This issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.
Workarounds
No workarounds to this issue are known.
References
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process.
1seal Reporter
Summary
Missing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path.
Impact
The tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject.
Impacted Versions:
tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x
Patches
This issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.
Workarounds
No workarounds to this issue are known.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, we ask that you contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via our vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process.